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Abstract: In the general perception, financial institutions’ immense repo and derivatives 
portfolios are friends and foes alike: friends, because they provide for levels of market liquidity 
that would be unimaginable without them. Foes, because both types of transactions are 
somehow regarded as being unstable and volatile in their nature, potentially exacerbating and 
accelerating crisis situations. This tension is also reflected in the treatment of repos and 
derivatives in the event of a corporate crisis. Insolvency law and relevant regulation seem to 
support and protect repo and derivatives transactions, while at the same time imposing limits 
on them, trying to balance liquidity arguments with those relating to stability. This paper 
concludes that regulation is better placed than insolvency law to address systemic stability 
concerns, whereas relevant insolvency rules guarantee high levels of liquidity while they are 
ineffective in terms of stability. The paper will concentrate on EU and US law, complemented 
by international benchmarks. It expands on certain aspects first developed my earlier paper on 
insolvency safe harbours.1 
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1 P. Paech, The Value of Insolvency Safe Harbours (2016) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 36(4) 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Banks and other financial institutions typically hold significant portfolios 
containing sale and repurchase (‘repo’) and derivative contracts. The former are an 
important means of financing, remotely comparable to a secured loan.2 The latter 
are contracts that serve for purposes of hedging against market or credit risk and 
are remotely comparable to insurance contracts.3 Both functions are vital to every 
individual financial institution and play an important role in the functioning of the 
modern financial market. As a consequence, the treatment of repo and derivatives 
portfolios in times of crisis has significant influence on the future viability of an 
ailing institution and on the stability of the market as a whole.  
In times of corporate crisis, from the perspective of an ailing financial 
institution the core question is whether the contracts will survive the crisis and can 
hence continue to provide their vital functions. If they cease to exist, in particular 
because they are terminated by the relevant counterparties, the ailing institution 
faces a significant financing gap and will be un-hedged in respect of significant 
parts of its exposures. Obviously, that outcome may exacerbate the institution’s 
unstable status and probably even push it over the brink. 
The perspective of the ailing institution’s counterparties presents the inverse 
view, at least to a large extent. They would, in principle, prefer to terminate 
contractual relationships, if necessary enforce available collateral in order to be 
able to refinance and re-hedge elsewhere. Thus, they will not get entangled in the 
ailing institution’s liquidation, or respectively, restructuring or resolution 
procedures. 
The perspective of the market as a whole is tricky. There may be both good 
reasons for keeping intact repo and derivative portfolios of an ailing financial 
institutions, and for terminating them.  
The first layer of arguments is linked to the fact that jurisdictions as a matter 
of policy lean more towards one or the other solution. From the viewpoint of a 
jurisdiction that is generally more debtor-friendly and favours restructuring over 
liquidation, maintaining the contracts helps keeping the ailing institution afloat. In 
more creditor-friendly jurisdictions, the argument is rather that assets should be 
channelled back into the economic cycle quickly, even at the cost of liquidating the 
relevant ailing business.  
                                                      
2 The semi-annual market survey of the relevant market association, ICMA, reveals that its 65 
participating European members had repos worth EUR 5.65bn outstanding on their books in 
December 2016. See http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/ 
short-term-markets/RepoMarkets/repo/latest/. 
3 The global open interests in exchange-traded futures and options market stood at 26tn USD 
in December 2016; the global market value of otc derivatives stood at 20tn market value in the 
first half 2016, see http://www.bis.org/statistics/about_derivatives_stats.htm?m=6%7C32% 
7C639.  
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However, legislators take further elements into account, especially in the 
context of banking and finance. Here, at a second level of argument, systemic 
stability concerns are factored in, assuming that allowing for the counterparties to 
pull out of the contracts quickly helps avoiding contagion, comparable to 
immediately quarantining an infectious patient. Links to other market participants 
are severed by allowing them to quickly terminate all repo and derivatives 
transactions. However, the argument may not always be clear-cut: mass 
termination of contracts can also cause adverse externalities, such as asset price 
depreciation, depending on circumstances.  
A third level of that argument relates to liquidity. Legislators and market 
participants alike strive to generate high levels of liquidity in order to support 
financial activity and growth. The basic idea is that by favouring those that offer 
repo and derivatives contracts more financial activity can be generated – very 
much like it is generally assumed that the possibility to take security for credit 
fosters the lending market and therefore investment. To this end, repo and 
derivative counterparties are afforded a favourable insolvency treatment, notably 
by allowing to cut lose immediately, as described before. Many link the 
exponential increase in repo and derivatives activity during the run up to the 
recent financial crisis also to this favourable treatment.4 
These three levels of arguments are difficult to disentangle in practice: rules 
that appear to have negative consequences for the failing institution are at the 
same time generally favourable for repo or derivatives creditors, while they may be 
either useful or even dangerous from the perspective of the market as a whole. 
Legislators cast their view on these issues into legal norms. These norms are 
either part of the insolvency law, which is the area of law that traditionally dealt 
with the question of how contracts with a business in crisis are treated. Or, 
relevant norms take the form of regulation, ie ordering or forbidding certain types 
of behaviour. As a result, the picture of relevant rules and their effects on stability 
and liquidity is extremely complex, also because it is quickly evolving since the last 
financial crisis. In this paper, I will show that, contrary to common perception, the 
function of so-called insolvency safe harbours is to enhance liquidity, while 
regulatory rules are needed to protect the financial system from contagion. 
In the second section, I will assess the effect of insolvency safe harbours, 
which are insolvency rules notably flowing from the implementation of the 
Financial Collateral Directive in the EU, and from changes brought over the time 
to Title 11 of the USC, in terms of their effect on systemic stability and liquidity. 
This section comes to the result that the case for systemic protection through safe 
harbours is relatively weak. Rather, their main function is to provide for high levels 
of liquidity in the repo and derivatives market, notably by allowing for highly 
efficient use of associated collateral. 
                                                      
4See Bank for International Settlements, Quarterly Review, December 2008 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0812e.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. 
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The third section is focussed on the novel alternative to insolvency, notably 
bank resolution, as enshrined in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and 
the Dodd-Frank Act. Here, the stance in respect of repo and derivatives portfolios 
is fundamentally different from the approach under insolvency law, and rules 
comparable to safe harbours do not exist in this context. As a consequence, since 
the introduction of bank resolution schemes, the insolvency safe harbours will 
hardly ever be used, at least not in systemically relevant bank failures. 
I will then move on, in the fourth section, to show that systemic implications 
of bank failures, including the implications connected to big repo and derivatives 
portfolios, are addressed in a variety of regulatory regimes. First, bank capital 
regulation sanctions the liquidity created by safe harbour and treats them as an 
integral part of the regime that is designed to render banks resilient against market 
stress. Second, a number of other rules address systemic implications flowing from 
the highly efficient use of financial collateral associated with repo and derivative 
transactions. They are designed to protect markets from downward spirals of asset 
prices, under-collateralisation and network effects. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 
2. INSOLVENCY LAW 
 
The insolvency law of most developed financial markets5 affords a creditor-
friendly treatment to repo and derivatives counterparties in case a financial 
institution fails or becomes insolvent. In the EU this area of law is harmonised, 
notably on the basis of the Financial Collateral Directive. Hence, similar rules 
addressing this issue can be found in all 28 EU jurisdictions. In the US, the matter 
is addressed in Title 11 (‘Bankruptcy’) of the United States Code, covering both 
liquidation in its Chapter 7 on and reorganisation in its Chapter 11. The relevant 
rules on both sides of the Atlantic have largely identical functional effects. They 
are called ‘insolvency safe harbours’ in the context of US law, however, there is no 
similarly handy term to described the rules of the FCD. Hence, I use ‘safe 
harbours’ throughout this chapter, meaning both the EU and the US rules.  
 
2.1. THE FCD AND USC TITLE 11  
 
The insolvency safe harbours of the FCD and USC Title 11 afford a special 
treatment to repo and derivative portfolios that protects the relevant parties from 
the usual effects of insolvency law should one of them fail. The mechanism of that 
                                                      
5 ISDA currently lists 57 jurisdictions that largely allow for quick termination, set off and 
enforcement of collateral as soon as a financial market participant becomes insolvent, see 
<http://www.isda.org/docproj/stat_of_net_leg.html#f1>. 
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protection is identical in both jurisdictions: the parties agree on a set of risk 
mitigation tools, in particular close-out netting and collateral, in their derivative 
and repo master agreements (in particular, ISDA and GMRA respectively). The 
clauses would normally be at risk of unenforceability should one of the parties fail, 
as they conflict with various general insolvency rules, notably those designed to 
protect the pari passu principle. However, the FCD and certain rules in USC Title 
11 protect these contractual clauses. How this protection works can be best 
described by referring to three different functional elements. 
The main element of that protection consists of insolvency law rules 
upholding contractual clauses that allow the liquidation of repo and derivative 
portfolios, even in the run up to insolvency and beyond the opening of relevant 
proceedings. These clauses typically provide for the solvent party to be allowed to 
‘close-out’, meaning that all repo and derivative contracts are terminated, that their 
market value (typically equivalent to the replacement cost) is determined, and that 
positive and negative values are set off to form a total net amount. This sum is 
very small in relation to the face value of the contracts and is to be paid from the 
party that is ‘out of the money’ to the one that is ‘in the money’. If insolvency 
proceedings have been opened over the party that is out of the money, the party 
that is in the money has to claim that sum from the insolvent estate as a general 
creditor, unless it is collateralised. Under the rules of the FCD and those contained 
in Chapter 11 USC agreements to that effect remain enforceable.6 
Further, safe harbours in the EU and the US protect what would outside the 
financial context be regarded as the late provision of collateral and amount to 
preferential treatment of a creditor. Financial parties generally include clauses in 
their contractual arrangements to the effect that collateral levels are constantly 
adjusted to properly reflect the relevant exposure flowing from the portfolio. As 
parties typically collateralise the anticipated net amount (ie after setting off 
contractual values, see above), the value of the collateral is regularly adapted to 
properly reflect the constantly changing anticipated net amount. This includes 
situation where the party that has been in the money so far becomes the party that 
is out of the money at a later stage, entailing a shift in who has to provide 
collateral to whom. This process is called margining. As margining is an on-going 
process the concept collides markedly with general insolvency rules that allow 
avoiding provision of collateral to the solvent counterparty if it occurred too close 
to the opening of liquidation proceeding, say during the last 3 months prior to 
insolvency. The background of the general rule is that late provision of collateral 
tends to disadvantage other general creditors of the insolvent. The Financial 
Collateral Directive and USC 11 protect margining, on the assumption that it only 
occurs to reflect changing values of the repo and derivatives portfolios and hence 
does not actually disadvantage other creditors.7 
                                                      
6 Articles 4(4), 7(4) Financial Collateral Directive; 11 USC §§ 362(b)(6)-(7)-(17)-(27) and (o); 
555-556, 559-561. 
7 Article 8(1)-(3) Financial Collateral Directive; 11 USC § 546(g), (j). 
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Equally important is the fact that in respect of repo and derivatives portfolios, 
insolvency law allows for swift enforcement of collateral in case of insolvency of 
the counterparty, regardless of the approach followed by the general insolvency 
law of the relevant jurisdiction.8 There is no waiting period or the need to apply to 
the receiver. Also, no special procedure, such as public auction of the collateral 
assets, has to be followed. Typically, the solvent counterparty can realise the 
collateral by selling it at market price. If contractually allowed, it might even be 
able to just hold on to it and apply its value to the outstanding debt.  
 
2.2. EFFECTS ON LIQUIDITY 
 
The liquidity rationale of the protection afforded by safe harbours has never 
received the same degree of prominence as the financial stability rationale, as 
described in the next part.9 On the face of it, safe harbours produce economic 
effects quite similar to those associated with the protection of traditional security 
interests in insolvency.10 Because parties need not worry about their counterparty’s 
solvency, derivatives and repo contracts become more easily available, and at a 
reduced cost. As a result, the basic economic effect of safe harbours is 
considerable growth in volumes of the relevant types of transaction and more 
efficient allocation of assets.  
In considering whether to introduce insolvency privileges, legislators must 
take into account the fact that such privileges almost automatically entail a shift of 
the risk from one segment of the market to another, the latter being potentially 
‘weaker’ creditors. In this regard, too, there are no fundamental differences 
between traditional security interests and the protection afforded under the FCD. 
Therefore, the basic assumptions about liquidity and the resulting discussion about 
the overall social value of insolvency privileges are very similar to those prevailing 
in the case of traditional security interests11 and will not be addressed here. Rather, 
                                                      
8 Article 4(4) and (5) FCD; 11 USC § 362(b)(6)-(7)-(17)-(27) and (o). 
9 See RR Bliss, and GG Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and 
Closeout’, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper 2005-3 (2005), 66 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=730648> accessed 10 March 2015. See 
Recitals 12 and 19 Financial Collateral Directive. See also ISDA, Memorandum on the 
Template for Netting Legislation (March 2006) <http://www2.isda.org/search?headerSearch 
=1&keyword=model+netting> accessed 10 March 2015, where the word ‘risk’ appears eight 
times, whereas ‘liquidity’ is not mentioned at all; American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI), 
Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 – Final Report and Recommendations (2014) 
94-95 <https://abiworld.app.box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h> accessed 10 March 2015, 
Section IV.E on ‘Financial contracts, derivatives and safe harbour protection’ mentions 
liquidity as a policy argument only once, and in the context of a side issue, whereas ‘stability’ is 
referred to eleven times. 
10 See V Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price’ (1999) 62 Modern Law 
Review 637-643. 
11 See, eg, Finch, ibid; LA Bebchuk and J Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured 
Claims in Bankruptcy’ (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 857-934. 
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I will concentrate on four novel effects of safe harbour rules that represent a 
quantum step in terms of increasing liquidity, in particular as their effects combine. 
 
Flexibility Across Legal Categories and Asset Types 
The risk mitigation techniques of master agreements, as protected by safe harbour 
rules, are used to abolish established legal boundaries. In particular, differences 
between full title and security interest disappear, and boundaries between claims, 
cash and securities become blurred. This high degree of flexibility is nothing less 
than revolutionary, overthrowing traditional legal restrictions on the use of assets 
with a view to obtaining cash and creating liquidity more generally.  
First, the differences between full title and security interests disappear 
because the safe harbours sanction the use of title transfer collateral, netting and 
margining.12 Under such arrangements, while the collateral provider is protected as 
efficiently as it would be under a traditional security interest such as a pledge or 
mortgage, the collateral taker enjoys far greater freedom to use the collateral assets 
than it would under a traditional security interest, in that it becomes the legal and 
beneficial owner of the asset and can therefore dispose of it, without being obliged 
to return that specific asset as long as the asset returned is of the same kind. What 
is remarkable here is that the rights of one party appear to grow whereas the risk 
borne by the other party remains unchanged. 
Furthermore, the boundaries between claims, money and securities become 
blurred as the collateral provider can validly substitute new collateral assets for the 
assets originally provided, which it might need for other purposes.13 The only 
proviso is that the replacement assets must be of substantially equivalent value. As 
a consequence, the collateral provider is allowed to replace one kind of securities 
collateral for another, or give cash for securities collateral, or claims for cash 
collateral, etc.  
On that basis, the specificity of the collateral assets becomes as irrelevant as 
their nature (money, claims or securities). Positions become interchangeable and 
the collateral provider will collateralize all available assets as efficiently as possible, 
thereby creating maximum return. The fact that assets are freed from the 
conceptual burdens associated with legal limits to traditional security interests 
means that they can be treated as mere accounting positions, the only parameter 
being current market value. Thus, thanks to the existence of safe harbours, a 
portfolio resembles a gigantic current account into which assets and liabilities, 
including collateral of whatever description, accruing under whichever type of 
arrangement, can be booked at current market value, so as to show the net 
exposure as a grand total.  
                                                      
12 ‘Margining’ is necessary because both the obligation and the value of the collateral asset 
typically change over time. Therefore, collateral levels are adjusted to the exposure on a daily 
basis. The obligation to post collateral might reverse in the course of the term of the contract; 
see, eg, Article 8(3) Financial Collateral Directive.  
13 ‘Substitution’ describes the right to withdraw financial collateral on providing, financial 
collateral of substantially the same value, see, eg, Article 8(3)(b) Financial Collateral Directive. 
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Efficient Use of Collateral 
A phenomenon closely connected to the foregoing is the fact that safe harbour 
rules enable collateral to be allocated so efficiently that there will hardly be any 
collateral buffers around. The first aspect here is the effect of the enforceability of 
close-out netting on collateral levels. If a risk reduction of 80% can be taken for 
granted,14 parties would, of course, only collateralize the remaining 20%. Hence, 
much less collateral will be needed from the outset or, to put it differently, the 
same amount of collateral will suffice to cover a higher volume of transactions.  
At the same time, master agreements make it possible constantly to adjust 
collateral levels to the underlying exposures so as to avoid over or under-
collateralisation. These margining mechanisms rely on a significant limitation of 
avoidance powers as provided by the safe harbour rules, as they might otherwise 
be classified as late provision of collateral (see above).  
Lastly, safe harbours enable the re-use of collateral assets by the collateral 
taker, given that the latter generally becomes their legal and beneficial owner. 
Therefore, as opposed to what is common in other markets (which are bound to 
traditional secured transactions, lack of safe harbour protection), the collateral 
taker will generally put the collateral assets to use instead of just ‘holding’ them, 
thereby maintaining the assets in constant flow.  
The result of the foregoing is that asset allocation is extremely efficient 
throughout the market. However, by the same token, it may also mean that the 
cover becomes extremely thin, as there are no longer any pools of unused assets. 
 
World-wide Use of Collateral 
Collateral assets are scarce and sourcing them from a wider market would 
therefore be beneficial in terms of liquidity. However, before the broad 
introduction of insolvency protection for repo and derivative transactions and 
associated collateral, financial institutions had to rely on domestic secured 
financing law. The diversity of mandatory insolvency and property law nurtured 
substantial doubts as to the cross-jurisdictional enforceability of master 
agreements, in particular regarding their close-out netting and collateral 
                                                      
14 The notional amount (face value) of all types of OTC contract stood at approximately 
USD 544 trillion at the end of June 2016. The gross market value of these contracts, ie, the 
cost of replacing all of them by equivalent contracts at the market price, was approximately 
USD 20.7 trillion. This amount corresponds to the gross market risk inherent in these 
contracts, ie, market participants were, on an aggregate basis, exposed to each other by that 
sum. At the same time, market participants’ aggregate actual credit exposures, ie, the remaining 
credit risk taking into account legally enforceable master agreements, amounted to USD 3.7 
trillion, which represents a risk reduction of about 80 %. See Bank for International 
Settlements, ‘OTC Derivatives Statistics at End-June 2016’ (November 2016) 11, 
www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1611.pdf, accessed on 4 January 2017. 
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arrangements.15 Cross-border collateral was possible but complicated to arrange, 
and each arrangement was only compatible within the two jurisdictions involved. 
The Financial Collateral Directive and USC Title 11 create a harmonised regime 
and led to the de facto abolition of traditional asset-based security interests amongst 
financial institutions. However, the phenomenon is not confined to the EU or US 
jurisdictions, as safe harbour rules are relatively homogeneous throughout all 
jurisdictions that have developed financial markets.16  
As a consequence, there is a harmonized legal space in which financial 
institutions can source and use collateral quasi-globally. The fact that there is now 
a level legal environment is illustrated by the circumstance that transactions can be 
documented in different markets under the same master agreements. In particular, 
the ISDA and GMRA master agreements have gained global significance17 
because their functionalities (termination, liquidation, set-off, collateral) are now 
recognized in the relevant jurisdictions. At the same time, the restriction of 
avoidance powers removes fears of re-characterisation, claw-back and similar 
court actions. Despite the fact that many legal differences remain as to detail, it is 
probably fair to say that the market for collateral, and therefore the market for 
derivatives and repos, comes close to having a globally harmonised legal 
framework. The extensive introduction of insolvency protection for repo and 
derivatives contracts is actually a significant example of market-driven high-impact 
international legal harmonisation,18 somehow silently overcoming statutory legal 
hurdles from which parties traditionally could not derogate. Mandatory insolvency 
and property law typically constituted the most significant threats to the 
enforceability of contracts. However, at statutory level, despite considerable 
efforts, to date States have been unable to agree on a legal framework that is 
compatible across borders. Sectoral harmonisation on the basis of the FCD, USC 
Title 11 and similar rules in other jurisdictions not only lessens the importance of 
domestic policy in matters of insolvency but also reduces the importance of legal 
considerations in risk management to a significant extent.  
 
2.3. EFFECTS ON FINANCIAL STABILITY 
 
At the surface, the safe harbour protection serves to decrease the risk inherent in 
the financial market.19 The significant limitation of individual counterparty credit 
                                                      
15 See, regarding enforceability of collateral: P Paech, ‘Market Needs as Paradigm – Breaking 
up the Thinking on EU Securities Law’, in PH Conac, L Thévenoz and U Segna (eds), 
Intermediated Securities, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 22-64; in relation to enforceability of 
close-out netting: ‘Close-out Netting’ (n 6). 
16 See above, 2nd Part. 
17 See Briggs J in Lomas & ors v JFB Firth Rixson, Inc & ors [2010] EWHC 3372 (Ch) at [53].  
18 See Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 9) 56. 
19 See, in particular, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Report and Recommendations 
of the Cross-Border Bank Resolution Group’ (2010) 36-40 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 
169.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. For US legislative history, see C Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy 
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risk is expected to have a beneficial effect on financial stability. In other words, 
privileges afforded to counterparties of a failing institution would translate into 
advantages benefiting the market as a whole. This argument is particularly relevant 
to the financial sector, even more so than to other sectors, as financial institutions 
are so closely intertwined.20 Network externalities are therefore much more likely 
to occur than they are in other industries, and furthermore spread from the 
financial sector to invade entire economies.21 On the basis of this broad argument, 
safe harbour rules have been successively introduced in many jurisdictions.  
However, it might be argued that specific insolvency ‘privileges’ for repo and 
derivative portfolios may also create systemic risk rather than curb it.22 Thus, 
while, on the one hand, credit risk contagion is effectively inhibited by close-out 
netting and collateral as protected by the safe harbour rules, it is also true that, on 
the other hand, these mechanisms can at the same time develop adverse systemic 
effects through other transmission mechanisms.23 Broadly speaking, relevant 
examples fall into two categories of risk transmission mechanism, to wit, moral 
hazard and collateral/liquidity shortages.  
 
Moral Hazard  
The FCD and the relevant provisions of USC Title 11 create a transaction 
environment for the parties to repo and derivative contracts that is almost entirely 
free of counterparty risk. This places financial institutions in a privileged position 
as compared to other, non-financial counterparties (although the degree of 
privilege differs from one jurisdiction to another24). Thanks to these privileges, 
risk is shifted to non-financial counterparties, including society, which alone have 
to bear the specific cost of bankruptcy. In that respect, the rules of the FCD and 
USC Title 11 have an effect quite comparable to that of traditional security 
interests. 
The existence of such a privilege is bound to affect the perception and 
conduct of market participants generally. As a result, the existence of safe 
                                                                                                                                       
Code’s Safe Harbors for Settlement Payments and Securities Contracts: When is Safe too 
Safe?’ (2014) 49 Texas International Law Journal, 245, 247-251. 
20 FR Edwards and ER Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special 
Treatment?’ (2005) 22 Yale Journal on Regulation, 111. 
21 Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 9) 66; SJ Lubben, ‘Repeal the Safe 
Harbors’, (2010) 18 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 319, 329.  
22 See, in particular, Lubben, ibid; Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator’ (2011) 63 
Stanford Law Review 539-589. 
23 K Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (2013) 41 Journal of Comparative Economics 315-
330, sections 3.2 and 4.3 provides evidence that the antagonising effects of financial law, ie 
creating and threatening liquidity at the same time, are a general and logical characteristic of the 
market. 
24 See P Paech, Insolvency Safe Harbours (n 1).  
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harbours may provoke moral hazard.25 In the context of financial regulation, the 
term ‘moral hazard’ describes a mechanism whereby real or presumed guarantees 
for the financial sector render the financial market more risk-prone on an 
aggregate basis. The phenomenon has been identified as a major driver of the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. For years, financial institutions had enjoyed high 
income generated by excessive risk-taking in the expectation that the cost of 
failure would be socialized. After the crisis, a number of regulatory changes were 
introduced in an attempt to tame moral hazard, with a view to re-allocating to 
financial institutions and their stakeholders the risk they themselves create.26  
Shifting the risk as such does not necessarily entail moral hazard. All kinds of 
insolvency privileges shift risk around the insolvent’s various types of creditors. 
The question, rather, is whether that shift entails a behavioural pattern that 
increases the risk overall, or, to put it differently, whether the level of systemic risk 
in the market as a whole increases. 
Such an overall rise in systemic risk could be caused in particular by market 
inefficiencies. Already in relation to traditional security interests, the possibility for 
bigger players to demand security indirectly subsidizes their businesses at the 
expense of certain other players, since the latter are unable to adjust to the 
increased risk.27 The effect of the risk transfer caused by insolvency safe harbours 
is similar: parties to whom risk is shifted are generally remote from the financial 
sector and as a result lack the ability to monitor the shift and adjust their own 
behaviour, in particular by demanding a higher risk premium or by not entering 
into the relevant position or quitting it altogether.28 The risk-taming effect of 
corrective behaviour at that end of the market is lacking, and this in turn renders 
the distribution of risk inefficient and the market overall riskier. It is worth noting 
that this shift of risk is global, as in practice all eligible creditors will take the 
necessary steps to move ahead of the pool by using the safe harbours.29 The risk is 
shifted to those that have no means of improving their position in any insolvency 
proceedings: in particular depositors, unsecured bond-holders, share-holders and 
‘ordinary’ creditors of the insolvent. It is true that non-adjusting market 
participants in the proper sense are few, traditionally they included retail 
depositors (which are now often protected by own preferences and/or deposit 
insurance) and SME creditors. However, mindful of the too-big-to-fail 
phenomenon, to which safe harbours contribute by allowing for exponential 
                                                      
25 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 22) 545. See DG Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s 
Uncontested Axioms’ (1998) 108 Yale L J 573, 578, 589-592. 
26 These measures include remuneration of bank managers, higher bank capital requirements, 
new bank resolution regimes, stricter regulation of derivatives, introduction of anti-cyclical 
capital and liquidity buffers, and others. See for an instructive overview <http://ec.europa.eu 
/finance/general-policy/policy/map_reform_en.htm#row7> accessed 10 March 2015.   
27 See Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk’ (n 10) 639.  
28 Edwards and Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code’ (n 20) 32, 34; Roe, 
‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 22) 570; Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk’ (n 
10) 644-645 (in relation to traditional security interests). 
29 See V Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 36. 
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growth of the derivatives and repo markets, the State has traditionally assumed the 
risk as a whole, so that even adjusting creditors have no need to take the shift of 
risk into account.30 
Furthermore, security may distort managerial diligence in the choice of 
counterparties.31 As before, this argument can be translated into the context of the 
privileged treatment of repo and derivative portfolios: financial counterparties rely 
exclusively on the risk-mitigation tools guaranteed under the safe-harbour regimes 
instead of investing into ex ante and on-going monitoring of their counterparties.32 
Yet, such overreliance could also lead to moral hazard.33 By contrast, if, in the 
absence of such protection, monitoring were a necessity, any concentration of risk 
on certain players would be detected and priced in by potential counterparties; as a 
consequence, there would be more players with smaller risk portions in the 
market, and the market would be more diversified overall.34 Moreover, in times of 
crisis, with falling or unclear collateral value, the information obtained through 
monitoring would allow lending to continue as healthy counterparties could 
continue to operate even in adverse times.35  
However, it is moot whether a case of moral hazard can be built on the 
foregoing. It is not evident that the market becomes riskier overall, as compared to 
the hypothetical alternative, a market without safe harbours. Hard evidence of 
such a connexion is difficult to establish and is often attempted with an eye to a 
preconceived result.36 To begin with, obviously, improved monitoring is always 
beneficial.37 Yet the value of monitoring highly complex, international and 
interconnected counterparties is limited. Comprehensive data regarding the 
counterparties is unlikely to be available. Even where such data is available, its 
value is limited as counterparties’ balance sheets are not static and are subject to 
network externalities, since the riskiness of assets depends on the market as a 
                                                      
30 See Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 22) 558-559; JM Peck, R Mokal and T 
Janger, ‘Financial Engineering Meets Chapter 11 Safe Harbors and the Bankruptcy Code’ 
(2011) <http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1402065/1/Peck,%20Mokal%20and%20Janger%20on 
%20Safe%20Harbors%20and%20the%20Bankruptcy%20Code.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015, 
12. It is debatable whether this holds true in all respects. The implicit State guarantee for banks 
might be regarded as the price paid for having energetic, growth-producing and stimulating 
financial markets. Although recent regulatory initiatives attempt to remove the State guarantee 
completely, it is not absolutely certain whether financial markets that go beyond pure utility 
banking can be governed in a way that makes bail-outs completely unnecessary in the future. 
See also more generally Pistor, ‘A Legal Theory of Finance’ (n 23) 323. 
31 See Finch, Security, Insolvency and Risk (n 10) 646. 
32 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 22) 560-561. 
33 Roe, ibid. 
34 Roe, ibid. 
35 Roe, ibid 567-568.  
36 Baird, ‘Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms’ (n 25) 589.  
37 See, in particular, efforts to strengthen due diligence regarding counterparties instead of 
exclusive reliance on credit ratings: Financial Stability Board, ‘Principles for Reducing Reliance 
on Credit Ratings’ (27.10.2010) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads 
/r_101027.pdf?page_moved=1> accessed 10 March 2015.   
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whole.38 Therefore, the available data says little about the riskiness of a balance 
sheet in times of stress. In other words, monitoring counterparties to prevent risk 
is generally useful but not as powerful a tool as reducing counterparty risk through 
security, collateral and close-out netting — for which the existence of safe 
harbours is essential. 
Speaking more generally, moral hazard, together with the too-big-to-fail 
argument, are amongst the main phenomena that have been identified as the 
origins of the recent financial crisis. They are not triggered by the special treatment 
of repo and derivatives portfolios alone but by an amalgam of causes and 
incentives and, probably, the fundamental socio-economic set-up of the financial 
market as a whole. Repealing or restricting safe harbours, as proposed by some39 is 
not, therefore, necessarily a suitable means of removing moral hazard, in particular 
because safe harbours are concerned above all with enforceability of contractual 
rights and only have an indirect influence on behaviour.  
 
Collateral/Liquidity Shortages  
When a financial institution fails, the liquidation rights of counterparties will be 
triggered at some point. The contractual arrangements with basically all 
counterparties are highly likely to be affected simultaneously.40 Such a scenario of 
mass liquidation can have adverse systemic effects that antagonize the beneficial 
systemic effects of the protection.41  
A first example42 of off-setting systemic benefits and drawback relates to a 
phenomenon that was a major transmission mechanism for systemic risk during 
                                                      
38 See, eg, AG Haldane and RM May, ‘Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems’ (2011) 469 
Nature 351-355. 
39 Bliss and Kaufman (n 9); Edwards and Morrison (n 20); Lubben (n 21); E Perotti, ‘Systemic 
Liquidity Risk and Bankruptcy Exceptions’ (2010) DSF Policy Paper Series No 8 
<http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/114634> accessed 10 March 2015; Peck, Mokal and Janger 
(n 30); Roe (n 22); D Duffie and D Skeel, ‘A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic 
Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements’ University of Pennsylvania Law School 
Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper No. 12-2 (2012) <http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982095> accessed 10 March 2015; DA Skeel and TH Jackson, 
‘Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy’ (2012) 112 Columbia Law 
Review 152-202; ER Morrison, MJ Roe and CS Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Safe Harbours’ 
(2014) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2484565> accessed 10 March 
2015. 
40 See, eg, Section 5(a)(vi) ISDA 2002 Master Agreement, the ‘cross-default’ provision 
following which a default event will occur if a party defaults on a third-party obligation and the 
default or the obligation is in excess of a specified threshold amount.  
41 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (n 61) para 115; Financial Stability Board, ‘Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions’ (2014) paragraphs 4.3-4.4 
and Annex IV  <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141015.pdf> 
accessed 10 March 2015; see Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 9) 20; 
Duffie and Skeel (n 39) 10. 
42 See Bliss and Kaufman, ‘Derivatives and Systemic Risk’ (n 9) 11, 18-19 and fig. 2; Edwards 
and Morrison, ‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code’ (n 20) 10-11; Morrison, Roe and 
Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’ (n 39) 14-16; Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment 
Priorities’ (n 22) 545-546. 
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the recent financial crisis. The failure of a major participant in the highly 
concentrated derivatives market causes a liquidity and collateral shortage. The 
FCD, on the one hand, protect the market from these failures because the relevant 
counterparties can have recourse to close-out netting and seize collateral. Thus, 
the failure of a major player is unlikely immediately to cause further insolvencies 
through the domino effect. However, all the insolvent’s counterparties would need 
to replace all terminated contracts in order to re-hedge their open positions, ie, a 
large number of new contracts would be created elsewhere in the market within a 
very short time frame. Fire-sale liquidation of collateral and the sale of further 
assets to be able to post cash collateral under the new contracts might 
considerably depress asset prices and might still push the entire market into a 
collateral crunch. 
A second example43 relates to the situation of financial institutions that are 
already ailing but not yet technically insolvent, or in relation to which no 
proceedings have as yet been opened. Does the protection of close-out netting 
and collateral arrangements exacerbate or improve their financial position? On the 
one hand, if parties are properly collateralized, close-out netting and collateral 
arrangements ensure that a market participant is able to continue trading, since as 
long as there is no actual failure (or other termination event), its counterparties will 
see no immediate need to pull out of the relationship.44 Thus close-out netting and 
collateral, at this stage, can help to prevent a further deterioration of the financial 
position of an ailing firm. On the other hand, it might be argued that as soon as 
the market becomes aware of financially deteriorating conditions, collateral 
arrangements will lead to calls for additional collateral, since the collateral taker 
will have initially made do with collateral the value of which was inferior to the 
actual exposure (which is common practice between financially healthy parties). 
This would force the ailing firm into a liquidation of assets in order to meet these 
demands and spark a depression in asset prices, as the valuation of assets is based 
on market price (‘mark-to-market’), thereby further aggravating the situation. The 
moment the firm failed to provide sufficient collateral to one of its many 
counterparties, thereby triggering close-out, cross-default clauses would ensure 
that virtually all contracts with other market participants were closed out at the 
same time, thus leaving the firm totally unhedged. Its financial position will 
prevent it from replacing these hedges at market price, a situation guaranteed to 
propel it over the brink of insolvency very quickly, rendering any further attempts 
at restoring viability useless. 
However, the above example does not concern the idea of safe harbours as 
such. Rather, it relates to the phenomenon of insufficient levels of initial 
                                                      
43 See Bliss and Kaufman, ibid 10, 19. Roe, ibid 565-566; see also Edwards and Morrison, ibid 
91, 94, 101 (citing the example of the failure of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 
1998). 
44 See Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’ (n 39) 9. 
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collateralisation. Parties use the freedom to adjust (!) collateral levels in ‘good 
times’ de facto to suspend the provision of any initial margin for an indeterminate 
period, notably as long as the obligor is financially sound.45 Apart from the fact 
that this practice could be exactly regarded as a preference in that it does not 
merely reflect a changing obligation,46 it is also problematic in terms of systemic 
risk; no great flight of imagination is needed to see that not enough collateral 
would be available should calls for additional collateral occur on a wider scale 
across the market, which is exactly the mechanism that caused the AIG insolvency 
during the financial crisis. Any defaults on calls for additional collateral would 
trigger liquidation under the relevant master agreements. Thus, insufficient initial 
margin, to the extent made possible by the insolvency safe harbours, would 
therefore appear to be a significant crisis accelerator.47  
In conclusion, the above example illustrates how the safe harbour rules 
contained in the FCD and USC Title 11 can limit and spread contagion at the 
same time — ‘which effect is more important is conceptually indeterminate’.48 
 
 
 
3. BANK RESOLUTION 
 
After the financial crisis, a new way of dealing with the failure of large financial 
institutions has been conceived and implemented in the EU and the US.49 Big, 
                                                      
45 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 22) 563. 
46 Roe, ibid, 573; Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (n 19) 257; Skeel and 
Jackson, ‘Transaction Consistency’ (n 39) 190-191. 
47 See FSB, ‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform’ (2010) para 3.6.2 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101025.pdf> accessed 22 
March 2015. 
48 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 22)  566-567. See Edwards and Morrison, 
‘Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code’ (n 20) 2. 
49 The US introduced this mechanism in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in 1991 to address 
negative externalities potentially caused by the exercise of termination rights. The FDIA was 
originally applicable to institutions with a banking licence. After the Financial Crisis, the US 
modelled a broader rule on the FDIA that was included in the Dodd-Frank Act, sections 
201(a)(11), 203, now also covering bank holding companies and, under certain conditions, 
non-banks. England and Germany adopted similar rules in 2009 and 2010. Also in 2010, the 
mechanism was elevated to global best practice by the FSB and several jurisdictions have since 
followed suit. In 2011, the FSB published twelve main features of effective resolution regimes 
which were updated in October 2014; see Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions (2014) <http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_141015.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015. The EU introduced a common rule 
in 2014 which is to be implemented in all Member States by 2015; see Directive 2014/59/EU 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for 
the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 
2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations 
(EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
[2014] OJ L173/190. 
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irreplaceable or highly interconnected50 banks and investment firms51 and, 
increasingly, financial market infrastructures,52 will no longer enter into insolvency 
proceedings but instead will be ‘resolved’. Authorities will now in practice use this 
new, special administrative procedure to stave off consequences of the kind 
experienced in the wake of the Lehman failure, deploying various tools such as 
transferring viable business to a state-owned bridge bank or a healthy other bank, 
or converting debt owed by the failing institution into shares of it (‘bail-in’).  
Despite supervisors and legislators insisting that insolvency is still the default 
option, in reality insolvency of systemically important financial institutions is 
becoming a well-nigh redundant concept. Insolvency laws are not even triggered 
as resolution is ordered by the relevant authority before insolvency proceedings 
have been commenced. Hence, there will be no insolvency official or court 
involved and the usual ‘threats’ to derivatives and repo portfolios, such as 
avoidance for preference will not be available. The rules of the FCD and Title 11 
USC do not apply in these cases. Their safe harbour provisions will therefore 
remain relevant only to the counterparties of failing financial institutions that are 
not resolved but enter insolvency proceedings. 
Regularly, master agreements allow for termination and close-out of repo and 
derivatives portfolios upon reorganisation or restructuring of the ailing party,53 ie 
before insolvency. However, these clauses will generally be ineffective as 
resolution eschews the route of privileged treatment through a safe harbour-like 
mechanism. Instead, resolution espouses the idea of an administrative stay or 
moratorium in respect of derivative and repo portfolios. The stay/moratorium 
operates either automatically, or may, and probably as a rule will, be imposed on 
the counterparties of the institution under resolution by the resolution authority.54 
In that, resolution procedures embrace an approach which is well-known from 
general insolvency law that applies to non-privileged parties.  
                                                      
50 International Monetary Fund/Bank for International Settlements/Financial Stability Board, 
Guidance to Assess the Systemic Importance of Financial Institutions, Markets and Instruments: Initial 
Considerations (2009) paras 12-15 <http://www.bis.org/publ/othp07.pdf> accessed 10 March 
2015. 
51 See article 1(1)(a) BRRD; sections 201(a)(7), (8), (11), 203(b) Dodd-Frank Act. 
52 Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures/International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, Recovery of Financial Market Infrastructures (2014) para 2.2.3 
<http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD455.pdf> accessed 10 March 2015; 
Financial Stability Board (n 94) para 1.2. In the EU, the Consultation on a framework for the 
recovery and resolution of financial institutions other than banks was closed on 28 December 
2012. No further steps have been taken so far. Under US law, large parts of the financial 
market infrastructure are already covered; see sections 201(a)(8), (11), (14), 102(a)(4)(C) Dodd-
Frank Act. 
53 See, for example, sections 10(a)(vi), (b)-(g), 2(a)(v) of the 2011 Global Master Repurchase 
Agreement; section 5(a)(vii) ISDA 2002 Master Agreement: 'a general assignment, arrangement 
or composition with or for the benefit of its creditors' is assigned to be an Event of Default 
and Termination Event. 
54 Articles 69-71 BRRD; section 210(c)(10)(B) Dodd-Frank Act. 
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The administrative stay on termination, set-off and enforcement of collateral 
was introduced to allow the competent authority to evaluate the financial contracts 
of an ailing institution and to decide which could be transferred to a healthy 
acquirer and which should remain in the ailing estate and be wound up. The idea is 
also to avoid important changes on the balance sheet caused by extensive exercise 
of termination rights.55 Resolution regimes are more clear-cut in this regard than 
insolvency laws. There are no exceptions from the administrative stay comparable 
to safe harbour rules in insolvency law.56 Indeed, the stay typically ends after two 
days and termination rights do not re-emerge in relation to those parts of the 
business saved by the regulator, in particular by transferring them to a financially 
healthy institution such as another bank. Termination rights are only revived in 
respect of those contracts which remain in the now isolated ‘toxic’ part of the 
estate which is destined to be liquidated by recourse to ordinary liquidation 
proceedings.57 But this rump estate would typically not be of systemic importance. 
Comparable to insolvency proceedings, bank resolution allocates losses and 
risks amongst creditors in the wider sense, including contractual counterparties 
(which in turn include general creditors, bondholders, depositors), shareholders 
and, society. It notably tries to tamper any systemic implications of the failure of a 
bank, avoiding that society actually becomes the main loss-bearing creditor, as is 
the case in the scenario of state bail out. However, if systemic risk is increasingly 
brought under control by bank resolution, ‘what then remains of the original 
rationale for the safe harbours’?58  
In fact, the scope of application of insolvency to failing banks has shrunk 
considerably since the introduction of bank resolution procedures. As a 
consequence, when examining the different scenarios, it becomes clear that 
insolvency proceedings with the aim of liquidating the relevant entity are 
nowadays well-nigh irrelevant in practical terms (despite their continued 
conceptual relevance for risk allocation). Counterparties of an ailing financial 
institution will now be able to trigger close-out and enforcement of collateral only 
under certain circumstances, depending on the concrete scenario.  
Firstly, there are counterparties that are not covered by safe harbour rules as 
a function of their own nature. This group comprises real economy actors but also 
certain types of financial institutions: while banks and investment firms are 
generally within the scope, for example, insurance companies are covered in 
                                                      
55 Recital (94) BRRD. 
56 However, title transfer financial collateral arrangements and set-off and netting arrangements 
shall be protected against split-up in the event of a transfer; see article 77 BRRD. 
57 Articles 71(1)-(5), 118 BRRD. The suspension does not, however, apply where the 
counterparty is a central bank, a central counterparty or a settlement system, ibid (3); section 
210(c)(8)(A) and (10)(B) Dodd-Frank Act. 
58 Morrison, Roe and Sontchi, ‘Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors’ (n 39) 3. 
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certain jurisdictions, but not in others.59 They are probably not systemically 
important to the financial sector.  
Secondly, insolvency safe harbours will still in principle apply to those 
financial market actors which fall within their scope of application, notably banks 
and investment firms. However, to the extent that such an entity contracts with a 
systemically important one the safe harbour will in practice have no effect as the 
systemically important counterparty will enter resolution under the BRRD or the 
Dodd-Frank Act, respectively. Hence, safe harbour rules only take effect in 
practice for banks and investment firms to the extent they are contracting with 
systemically irrelevant counterparties.  
As a result, the safe harbour rules will remain without effect in the most 
systemically relevant failures, notably those of systemically relevant banks, 
investment firms and infrastructures. Instead, regulators will use a completely 
different set of legal mechanisms to avoid contagion, including a stay on 
termination of contracts. Where insolvency proceedings may still occur, notably 
upon failure of a systemically irrelevant financial institution, the systemic risk 
rationale of safe harbours does not bite: the failure of such an institution is 
unlikely to contribute significantly to systemic risk, either through knock-on 
effects on counterparties or by leading to a liquidity crunch.60  
Thus, it is probably fair to state that the introduction of bank resolution 
regimes has considerably reduced the scope of application of safe harbours mainly 
to systemically irrelevant scenarios.  
 
 
 
4. CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER RESILIENCE-
FOCUSSED REGULATION 
 
Safe harbours, in practice, have lost most of their relevance in terms of reducing 
risk in the event of an actual failure of financial institutions. However, safe 
harbours are more than a building block of risk management inside financial 
institutions, where the amounts at risk in the counterparty’s insolvency are the 
indicator for the credit risk a financial institution is running. They also 
conceptually intertwined with resilience-focussed financial regulation. In particular, 
bank capital requirements refer to safe harbour rules, recognising their risk 
reducing effect. At the same time, new regulatory approaches more specifically 
address the vulnerability to adverse market developments of collateral 
arrangements, thus aiming at mitigating any negative impact the safe-harbour-
induced high levels of liquidity may have on financial stability. 
                                                      
59 See P Paech, The need for an international instrument on the enforceability of close-out 
netting in general and in the context of bank resolution, Unidroit, March 2011, S78c Doc.2, 30. 
60 Bliss and Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk (n 9) 17. 
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4.1. CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND SAFE HARBOURS 
 
Banking regulation sanctions the risk reducing effect of safe-harbour-protected 
master agreements which govern banks repo and derivatives portfolios. Notably, 
the Basel Accord recognizes the net exposures used by financial institutions for 
risk management purposes also with a view to calculating capital requirements. 
The relevant regulatory rules require absolute certainty that close-out netting and 
collateral will be enforceable in the event of insolvency, ie it requires safe harbour 
rules to work smoothly and reliably.61 If that is so, banks are allowed to calculate 
their regulatory capital on the basis of net risk. Otherwise, repo and derivatives 
portfolios need to be accounted for with their gross risk. The average risk 
reduction through close-out netting alone is roughly 80%. In order to grasp the 
effect of this significant reduction, it may be helpful to recall that regulatory capital 
is not, as is often assumed, a requirement to hold certain cash reserves available. 
Rather, regulatory capital describes the ratio between risk exposure and the capital 
raised by issuing own shares. As a consequence of the recognition of net risk of 
repo and derivatives portfolios, a bank is able to enter six times the gross risk in its 
balance sheet than it would otherwise be allowed to accept.62 
The effect is two-fold.63 First, availability and liquidity of repo transactions 
are improved because absolute regulatory limits accommodate a higher volume 
where calculation on a net basis is allowed. This effect is not necessarily confined 
to derivatives and repo transactions but extends across the balance sheet to any 
other risk-taking activity such as ordinary lending. If as a consequence of the 
special protection less capital is needed to match derivatives and repo transactions, 
ordinary lending activity may likewise be increased. The second effect is a cost-
saving element for banks, since share capital is a relatively expensive means of 
financing. If contracts of a higher aggregate volume can be entered on the basis of 
the relevant available share capital base, their relative cost decreases. 
 
                                                      
61 Bank for International Settlements/Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Comprehensive version)’ (June 
2006 – ‘Basel II Accord’) paras 117, 118, 139, 188 <www.bis.org/publ/ bcbs128.htm> 
accessed on 15 March 2015; ‘Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector’ (December 
2009) 43 <www.bis.org/publ/bcbs164.pdf?noframes=1> accessed 15 March 2015. 
62 By way of a simplified example: a bank’s derivative and repo portfolio is taken into account 
at a gross risk of 1000 GBP because there are no safe harbours. This risk needs to be matched, 
at the current minimum rate of 10.5% regulatory capital, by 105 GBP in own share capital. In 
other words, the amount of issued share capital limits the possibility to take on more risk. 
However, if netting is allowed the bank can, on the basis of the same 105 GBP in share capital, 
enter into contracts exposing it to a gross risk of 5000 GBP if we assume that close-out netting 
reduces the gross risk by 80%. 
63 See Paech, ‘The Need for an International Instrument on close-out netting’ (n 59) 16-19. 
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4.2. REGULATION AIMING AT EFFECTIVE COLLATERALISATION64 
 
During the financial crisis entire market segments froze despite the fact that the 
relevant market participants had concluded master agreements, were collateralised 
and, hence, should have been theoretically safe from counterparty credit risk. As 
master agreements regularly include margining provisions, they were also, in 
principle, protected against any depreciation in value of their collateral assets. 
However, while there was no doubt regarding the enforceability of collateral 
arrangements, the devaluation of the relevant assets  and the availability of 
sufficient collateral turned out to be highly problematic, spurring a feedback loop 
involving repeated margin calls and further asset value depreciation that ultimately 
lead to a collateral crunch – which was one of the core triggers in the initial phase 
of the crisis, originally induced by doubts regarding the value of repackaged 
mortgage-backed securities. In other terms, the concept of collateral did not meet 
the expectations in terms of providing a sufficient level of resilience against 
adverse market events, neither at the individual level nor, and this is the core issue, 
at the level of the market as a whole. In short, if pre-crisis collateral had actually 
been as rock-solid as it was supposed to be, the financial crisis would not have 
happened. 
The starting point of my argument is the general vulnerability to asset value 
depreciation, which is intrinsic in both the concepts of collateral and traditional 
security. The phenomenon itself cannot be avoided. Instead, the financial system 
must rely on mechanisms that identify and mitigate potential systemic effects of 
asset value depreciation. As a consequence of the crisis, a number of measures 
have been discussed, many of them in the context of ‘shadow banking’.  
The initial environment in which the financial crisis unfolded was 
characterised, amongst other things, by credit ratings of asset-backed securities 
that were systematically too positive. This defect coupled with the phenomenon 
that market players tend to react in similar ways to changing market conditions (on 
rational or even irrational grounds). This herding effect can easily turn value 
adjustments and corresponding margin calls into a systemic issue. Therefore, 
avoiding systematic overvaluation of assets is the first step to ensure that the 
concept of collateral is able to provide the protection it expected to provide. Thus, 
the first, urgent, adjustment to make was to ensure more accurate valuation of 
assets that are taken as collateral. This is where recent regulation of rating agencies 
                                                      
64 See, in particular, European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on reporting and transparency of securities financing 
transactions (29.01.2014) COM(2014) 40 final <http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc 
/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-40-EN-F1-1.Pdf> accessed 9 April 2015; FSB, Strengthening 
Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking, (29.8.2013) 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_130829a.pdf>; Regulatory 
Framework for Haircuts on non-centrally cleared securities Financing Transactions 
(14.10.2014) http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_141013a.pdf. 
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comes into play, aiming at the improvement of the processes that lead to a rating65 
and at the removal of systematic overreliance on them.66 
The pre-crisis capital requirements regime was furthermore responsible for a 
closely connected problem. As a consequence of the cyclical nature of asset prices, 
banks may be well capitalised during phases of economic upturn but need to 
divest in times of economic contraction to avoid undercapitalisation. The value of 
collateral assets is immediately linked to this phenomenon: selling off assets causes 
further asset value depreciation, eventually resulting in an asset price downwards 
spiral. Hence, removing pro-cyclicality in capital requirements is a factor closely 
intertwined with the question of whether collateral can provide effective 
protection against counterparty and market risk or whether it unable to.67 
Equally closely connected to the foregoing is a market practice that I briefly 
addressed earlier in this paper, ie that of posting initial collateral that does not 
cover the entire net risk of a derivatives or repo portfolio. Often, no collateral at 
all was effectively posted between big market players. Margin calls occur only as 
soon as the financial situation of one of the parties deteriorates. 68 This kind of 
market behaviour has the potential to significantly exacerbate financial instability. 
There are good reasons for safe harbour regimes allowing for margining during 
the lifetime of the contract. The rational for allowing margining is to prevent 
unenforceability of collateral provided prior to insolvency, including collateral 
provided during a so-called suspect period. From the insolvency law perspective, 
this seems acceptable because there is no need for avoidance.69 If applied 
consistently, margining does not actually constitute preferential treatment. Other 
creditors are not disadvantaged because there is no net outflow of assets from the 
pool. However, safe harbour rules in many jurisdictions, including those of the 
FCD and USC Title 11, do not distinguish on the basis of the criterion of net 
outflow but restrict avoidance more generally.70 As a consequence, later delivery of 
collateral is not voidable even in cases in which there is a net outflow of value 
                                                      
65 This includes various measures aimed at the removal of conflicts of interests within CRAs 
and at the improvement of their methodology, see Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on credit rating agencies (as 
last amended by Directive 2014/51/EU), Articles 6-10.  
66 Ibid, Articles 5a, 5b and 5c. 
67 See in particular the ‘countercyclical buffer’, Directive 2013/63/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions 
and the prudential supervision of credit institutions, as amended, [‘Capital Requirements 
Directive’] Article 130. 
68 See FSB, ‘Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reform’ (2010) para 3.6.2 
<http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_101025.pdf> accessed 22 
March 2015. 
69 See Recital 16 Financial Collateral Directive.  
70 See, in particular, Recital 16 Financial Collateral Directive: ‘The intention [of restricting 
avoidance] is merely that the provision of top-up or substitution financial collateral cannot be 
questioned on the sole basis that the relevant financial obligations existed before that financial 
collateral was provided, or that the financial collateral was provided during a prescribed period. …’ 
(emphasis added). 
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from the estate. In practice, parties use this freedom in ‘good times’ to suspend the 
provision of initial margin for an indeterminate period, notably as long as the 
obligor is financially healthy.71 Yet this practice not only offends against the 
rationale for safe harbours, in that it does not merely reflects an increased 
obligation.72 It is particularly problematic in terms of systemic risk, as there is a 
significant danger that not enough collateral would be available should calls for 
additional collateral occur on a wider scale across the market. Any defaults on calls 
for additional collateral would trigger liquidation under the relevant master 
agreements. Thus, insufficient initial margin, to the extent made possible by the 
insolvency safe harbours, would appear to be a significant crisis accelerator. After 
the crisis, the international community set standards on initial margin.73 These 
standards pay particular attention to the equilibrium of systemic risk on the one 
hand and liquidity on the other hand, notably by imposing gradual requirements 
that are also phased in over a longer period. 
These measures are complemented by regulation requiring ‘mandatory 
haircuts’; these are risk management measures whereby the value of collateral 
assets is calculated as their market value reduced by a certain percentage (the 
‘haircut’). A collateral taker applies haircuts in order to protect itself from losses 
resulting from declines in the market value of the collateral asset in the event that 
it needs to liquidate that collateral. ‘Mandatory’ haircut refers to a legal 
requirement to apply such abatement for risk management purposes.74 
These regulatory rules are conceived directly to address the systemic risk 
flowing from the use of repos and derivative transactions. It would not be possible 
to achieve similarly well-calibrated solutions to that problem by abolishing or 
restricting safe harbour regimes — such an approach would be too bold and the 
resulting legal uncertainty would paralyse the market, as nobody would be able to 
rely on the enforceability of contractual risk mitigation. 
 
 
                                                      
71 Roe, ‘Derivatives Market Payment Priorities’ (n 22) 563. 
72 Roe, ibid., 573; Mooney, ‘The Bankruptcy Code’s Safe Harbors’ (n 19) 257; Skeel and 
Jackson, ‘Transaction Consistency’ (n 46) 190-191. 
73 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and Board of the International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions, ‘Margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ (March 
2015) <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d317.htm> accessed 17 March 2015; IOSCO 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, ‘Principles for Financial Market 
Infrastructures’ (April 2012) Principle 6 <http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf>; 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 
on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (commonly called ‘EMIR’) 
Article 46(1).  
74 See European Central Bank online glossary, <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home 
/glossary/html/glossh.en.html> accessed 10 March 2015; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision and Board of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions, ‘Margin 
requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives’ (March 2015) <http://www.bis.org 
/bcbs/publ/d317.htm> accessed 17 March 2015. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The current approach as to how repo and derivatives portfolios are treated in the 
event of crisis appears to be somewhat confusing. On the one hand, risk 
measurement and management still focuses on the hypothesis of insolvency, 
deducing main risk indicators from the level of counterparty credit risk. 
Counterparty credit risk, in turn, is critically determined by the rules of insolvency 
law, which include the so called safe harbours that preserve enforceability of 
termination, close-out netting and collateral arrangements. In practice, however, 
these insolvency laws have lost most of their relevance, as insolvency of financial 
institutions became a well-nigh redundant concept, applicable only to systemically 
irrelevant market participants. 
Still, safe harbour rules need to be maintained, as there is no better alternative 
to the somehow privileged treatment of repo and derivatives portfolios. It is, in 
particular, difficult to imagine that safe harbours could be disapplied without 
basically wiping out the market for repo and derivatives transactions. At the same 
time, it is important to realise that there is no need to do so from the point of view 
systemic risk: insolvency safe harbours are overall neutral as regards the creation 
of systemic risk. While they may contribute to it in certain scenarios they may also 
reduce it in other situations. Further, without a functioning safe harbour 
framework risks inherent in repo and derivatives portfolios would become 
incalculable and hence unacceptable from a commercial and regulatory viewpoint. 
Lastly, the financial market including its framework for prudential regulation is 
based on an existing, highly liquid repo and derivatives environment. As safe 
harbours considerably contribute to these high liquidity levels, while at the same 
time being risk-neutral, they ought to be maintained. 
However, it is true that systemic risk may arise from significant repo and 
derivatives positions. The last financial crisis has shown that they can be the 
source of considerable instability. Hence, this risk needs to be addressed. After the 
financial crisis, new, regulation-based approaches were conceived with a view to 
target the various aspects that contribute to this risk. As systemic risk is typically 
multi-causal, its mitigation involves a combination of measures. In the present 
context, the first building block is the removal of moral hazard – an aim that is 
now pursued by the introduction of bank resolution regimes. In addition, more 
specific measures have been adopted with a view to decreasing systemic risk, 
notably by improving resilience of individual market participants and of the 
market as a whole. In relation to the dangers flowing from big repo and 
derivatives portfolios these new measures consist of the introduction of 
countercyclical buffers, various improvements regarding the quality of credit 
ratings, rules mandating a more consistent initial collateralisation and mandatory 
haircuts applied to collateral assets. These measures are a much more effective 
tool to keep systemic implications of repo and derivatives portfolios under 
control. 
 
